Product Planning and Engineering at Chrysler Corporation

Former Product Planner Burton Bouwkamp wrote about the process, 1960s-1970s:

The CEO (Lynn Townsend, then John Riccardo, then Lee Iacocca) established the product renewal budget (money available for new model tooling). We (Product Planning) then put together a 6 to 8 year product plan that was within that budget. This plan was submitted to the CPPC (Corporate Product Planning Committee) for review and approval. The CPPC was chaired by the CEO.

The CPPC also approved the styling of a new model but that was a "rubber stamp" approval because the styling had already been approved by the ASC (Advance Styling Committee).

In the case of the unique Barracuda and Challenger door skins, this addition to the Product Plan was jointly proposed by Styling and Product Planning and then approved by the ASC and the CPPC. Styling prepared clay models with common door outers and with unique door outers to show the additional appearance distinction that unique door outers permitted.

A bodies were marginally profitable so hitting control (financial planning) volumes and a rich carline mix was important. (We usually got $3 in price for every upgrade dollar that we put in high line and premium line vehicles.) The A body styling changes in the mid-1970s were minimal because we knew that the "F" Body Volare/Aspen would be replacing the Valiant and Dart. There is no truth to anyone blocking Duster styling [e.g. aero rear windows] from use on other Valiants.

[With regard to the K cars:] We knew there would be 2 door and 4 door station wagon models but we did not anticipate the G-24 coupe (Daytona) or the convertible. (Both were Lee Iacocca additions.) We also did not anticipate the stretched wheelbase Chrysler and Dodge 600 ("E" Body) models. The "E" Body evolved from the success of the Plymouth and Dodge "K" cars.

Bob Sheaves, engineer, wrote about the engineering process, 1990s:

The Direct Reports are responsible for implementing the directives of the Management Oversight Board, ,and recommend changes to the MOB on directives that are not in the best interest of the company. Unlike other manufacturers, Chrysler of the 1990s learned that there is no one that understands a worker's job better than the person doing that job. One of the most important decisions the MOB made was to implement a policy of allowing and encouraging all people working for AB to critique decisions by their own management, that affects their own job.

In practical application, this meant any production line team leader with an assembly problem could call directly to the PRODUCTION ENGINEERING Group responsible when there was a problem with an assembly job. Common problems worked out in this manner would be ergonomic functionality (line worker could not perform job due to awkward positioning, time, etc.), timing (not enough time to do the job), etc. The UAW, representing the assembly workers under this agreement found this to be innovative and novel approach to solving the ages old "responsibility for quality control issues" so prevalent during the previous 20 years.

The responsibilities of each of the direct reports to the CEO were:

DESIGN ENGINEERING- to take MOB selected ideas from the corporation and others and develop concept studies ("on-paper or computer screen" car proposals) for evaluation by focus groups, the MOB itself, and CEO. The MOB then chooses the most likely appealing studies to be turned into a public reaction test vehicle, otherwise known as a "show car".

PREPROGRAM ENGINEERING works concurrently with DESIGN ENGINEERING to provide the ideas and concepts to turn these vehicles into a production vehicle that can be manufactured economically and quickly, and also provides the "hard points" of a design. This is a series of features that are unmodifiable by any other group and define the character of the vehicle.

The "show cars" that get to the build stage are then built by an outside contractor, supervised by a joint DE, PPE, and FINANCIAL team subgroup (usually 3-4 people) that are then responsible for the completion of the project "on time and under budget".

PREPROGRAM ENGINEERING- to take an approved design concept (show car or"paper" vehicle) and provide the needed design and engineering functionality to turn the vehicle to an "80 percent feasible build".

This means that PPE will take the DESIGN ENGINEERING "dream" and decide how to build the car, how it is going to handle, what engines will be used and how they will be hooked up, how the interior fits the passengers and driver, etc.

Team members from DESIGN ENGINEERING, PRODUCTION ENGINEERING, FINANCIAL, and INFORMATION SYSTEMS (marketing) are temporarily assigned to PPE for this phase of the program. When PPE has completed its job, the assignees return to their respective groups, following the process along.

PRODUCTION ENGINEERING- to take the PPE "80 % vehicle" and complete the design necessary to produce the car. This involves manufacturing personnel, analysis personnel, tooling personnel, plant design personnel, etc. all working under the PRODUCTION ENGINEERING banner. All corporate components, such as engines, transmissions, and other esoteric components are the responsibility of the people of the PRODUCTION ENGINEERING department.

In addition, team members from PPE and FINANCIAL are transferred with the project to ensure continuity in the design.

TEST ENGINEERING- provide analysis support to all 3 previous groups, testing of individual, critical components, and full vehicle development testing, such as durability, roof crush and safety standards compliance.

CORPORATE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS- responsible for all expenditures related to a car design. From overtime to booking travel arrangements, CFS is responsible to the MOB (they set the amount of allocated money) for holding the line on costs as a vehicle is designed.

CORPORATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS- responsible for ensuring that each employee knows how his job is integrated into the other co-workers. In addition, training on all corporate design and engineering software is conducted, skills of the employees are upgraded, and the corporation is watched for job overlap — leading to excessive spending.

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