by Dr. David George Briant. Courtesy of the Walter P. Chrysler Club / the WPC News, July 1999.
Some time ago, I beheld an apparition from a bygone age: a genuine B-29 Superfortress! Her gleaming flanks, huge engines, 16 and 1/2-foot propellers, towering tail, and proud stance drew me in... and then, one by one, her engines turned, coughed, and roared to life. That lucky pilot opened those throttles and she moved regally into takeoff position. Thundering Wright Cyclone engines and all, this beautiful creation accelerated down the long runway, lifted magically, and soared out of sight.
The famous B-29 was engaged in the same duties as the 12,726 work-horse B-17 “heavies” (optimistically called Flying Fortresses) or the more numerous B–24 Liberators (18,188) during World War II. The B-29s were bigger and faster, well-balanced, efficiently armed, and tough. All 3,628 had pressurized cabins.
The B-29 last flew an armed combat mission nearly 46 years ago, on July 27, 1953. The giant plane’s largest single day of operations was on August 1, 1945, when 836 four-engined giants attacked twelve key targets in Japan and Korea; 784 aircraft returned.
This was achieved just over about four years after the United States Army Air Corps order of May 17, 1941 for 14 service test YB-29s and 250 production B-29s (LeMay and Yenne, p. 201) — high stakes gambling beyond the imagination of Las Vegas, since not a single such radical design had been built yet.
Chrysler military and space:
Radar and radar-guided guns
M3, Sherman, and Pershing tanks
Chrysler and the atomic bomb
Huntsville: Aerospace and Military
Military production, 1940-1942
Jeep and Bantam (BRC)
Jeep MA and MB
Dodge and the Burma Road (China)
Dodge and the Red Ball Express
Nash - Jeffery Quad (WWI 4x4)
Chrysler and the Redstone Missiles
Chrysler lifts NASA
Chrysler on the Moon
Humber and its military vehicles
On December 7, 1941, Army Air Corps planners determined that the large-scale B-29 program would require a major new source of Wright Cyclone engines. In early 1942, Chrysler Corporation was asked to undertake the incredible task, with the first engines to be built in March, 1943, ramping up to an output of 1,000 per month by January, 1944. There was no designated plant, no machines, not even a factory design (Stout, p. 10-13).
Future president L. L. “Tex” Colbert was named General Manager of the project; future president William C. Newberg became Chief Engineer; C. J. Synder was Master Mechanic; W. H. Eddy was Production Manager; and H. J. Laidlaw was Plant Engineer (Stout, p. 8-9).
Chrysler engineers and factory people journeyed quickly to Wright's plant near Paterson, New Jersey. The 18-cylinder engine was just 37 running hours into its initial test program of 150 hours. The big radial had to be brought under drawing control before there was any chance for successful mass production. The first XB-29 airframe was still nine months from completion.
Within days, a site (“Dodge-Chicago”) was selected; given the shortage of steel, architect Albert Kahn and Chrysler people designed a pioneering reinforced arched-rib concrete setup that used half the steel per square foot of a conventional design, saving about 9,200 tons of steel for other uses.
George A. Fuller Company was the prime contractor for construction, which ran day and night from June 1942 until they had finished 6,300,000 square feet of floor space in a 19-building complex; in less than a year, sixteen buildings were done. Occupying 30 city blocks, the buildings and infrastructure cost $173,000,000 of 1942 money (Stout, pp.12-15), roughly $2.4 billion of 2012 money.
The main building was 82 acres in size, with 22 acres air-conditioned (needed for precise assembly). Dodge-Chicago was the only aircraft engine factory that took in pigs of aluminum and magnesium at one end and pushed out finished engines at the other.
Rather than waste fuel in testing, Mr. Newberg had new engines generate electricity during test, yielding 91,106,000 kilowatt hours, around on equarter of the project’s total electrical use.
As testing of the B-29 began, in 1942, the Wright-built engines began to give trouble, disturbing but not unexpected in a radical new design being rushed through.
Tragically, February 18 saw the loss of the second experimental craft due to an engine-linked fire spreading to the major wing spar. Despite rapid moves by the always composed and cool Eddie Allen, the XB-29 lost altitude too rapidly to make the end of the Boeing runway and crash-landed on top of the five-story Frye Packing Company meat-packing building in Seattle. All eleven experts aboard, including Allen, were killed, as were several Frye employees and city firemen (LeMay and Venne, pp. 62-4). Officials braced themselves for a security breach, but none occurred. By this time, orders had been placed for 1,664 of the giant planes, but what about those engines?
The Wright Cyclone engine had actually begun in 1927, as a nine-cylinder with a hemispherical combustion chamber and air cooling, generating 525 horsepower. The engine was frequently increased in output afterwards, including a doubling of its cylinders to 18, (Note: some sources state, in error, that the B-29 engines were nine-cylinder units) but with no increase in bore and stroke, or any enlargement of frontal area.
Cowling was tighter than on the B-17, whose engines were rated at 1,200 horsepower each at takeoff power setting (Ethell and Price, p. 10). Higher compression ratios and supercharging were the principal routes to the 2,200 horsepower unit that Dodge was build under urgent conditions. The horespower to weight ratio of the engine were fifteen times higher than that of the railroads’ crack Superchief diesel locomotive.
60 engines promised by the end of January 1944; more tooling, to raise production to a newly-increased rate of 1,600 per month, was coming. In June, 344 engines were delivered, over the scheduled of 225. On July 13th, the 1,000th engine was shipped. In October, 957 engines were delivered, nicely exceeding the schedule of 850. Momentum was building and engine storage became a new, but happy, problem.
By the end of January 1945, over 7,500 engines had now been delivered, and by July 15, 1945, Dodge-Chicago output passed 16,000 engines; the contract closed with Japan's surrender, when the plant had made 18,413 engines (Stout, pp. 41-45).
Mass-producing the Cyclone required continuing revisions and re-designs — 6,427 design changes in all (Note: Stout states two figures, 6,427, p.46; 6,274, p. 23), usually involving groups of parts, some with as many as 150 separate items. In turn, these design changes generated 48,500 engineering releases and change notices, almost always resulting in methods, materials, or tooling changes.
The rear cylinders overheated because there was not enough clearance between cylinder baffles and the cowl; changes that increased low-speed cooling backfired on high-temperature airfields in the Pacific, especially since the aircraft were loaded to their maximum capacity. Pilots were trained to lift slowly, using as much of the runway as they could to cool the engines before slowly climbing — so they could build speed before going into thinner air.The engines often “ate” their own valves, causing fires worsened by the use of hot-burning magnesium in the crankcase and supercharger housings. The magnesium also caused the crankcases to expand at a different rate than the rest of the components, causing oil leaks which were another cause of fire and failure; the crankcase material was never changed. Backfiring through the carburetor could also cause fires until they started using fuel injection.
The engine had to be virtually re-engineered while in production. Dodge assigned 120 graduate engineers, with assistants, to work on 26 major improvements, resulting in pre-stressed pistons, shot-peened connecting rods, high-pressure polishing, fuel injection at 2,500 psi with tolerances often-millionths of an inch, increased oil pressure to help with cooling, and supercharging. Industrial diamonds were used in the boring of piston pin holes. Chrysler's Superfinish was used and magnetic inspection blossomed.
Cooling was a problem with no simple solution. Wright increased the aluminum fins on each cylinder barrel from 40 to 54, enlarging cooling area to 325 square feet per cylinder head and barrel. Exhaust valve design was improved throughout the program. Dodge designed the ignition harness. Steadily, the problems began to yield. Engine life was gradually extended, from 200 hours before overhaul was needed, to about 400 in the early spring of 1945.
On their way India and China, the B-29s were subjected to ground temperatures in the sun that were regularly well over 120° F. Temperatures reached nearly 200° inside the planes, with some engines only about 20 degrees from overheating even before firing up. Detonation was a severe problem, directly affecting valve life, and parts kits were rushed out to speed the planes to their destination. Teams fanned out to wherever B-29s were in the pipeline.
In China, fuel had to be flown in over the Himalayas, slowly building up enough gasoline and bombs to launch the first group of strikes. These missions were flown at high altitudes, dropping high-explosive bombs. A number of the trips were regarded as training of the most serious kind. Airfields in China were constructed by thousands of Chinese people using hand labor and rudimentary tools. (See the Dodge “China truck” section.)
Wright engines converted their entire Cincinatti plant to building R-3350 and created a new facility in Woodbridge, New Jersey for them, eventually making 13,800 engines versus Chrysler’s 18,400.
Perhaps the greatest compliment to Dodge-Chicago performance was that their engines were used interchangeably with Wright’s. Dodge eventually provided the vast majority of the engines: 18,413 for 3,628 B- 29s, or just over five engines per plane.
After General LeMay took command in January, 1945, he re-structured the maintenance program, and flying reached a tremendous 120 hours per plane per month. During their 1944 and 1945 service against Japan, they dropped 169,676 tons of bombs, adding another 167,000 tons during the three years of the Korean War (by which time they needed escorts due to the advent of jet fighters). Actual bombing runs after arrival at the target were carried out at 210 mph (LeMay and Yenne, p. 150).
On a per unit basis, Dodge-Chicago was able to reduce the cost of producing each engine from $25,314 plus a fee of $1,519 to $11,537 (fee, $580) and $12,954 for the fuel-injected version, all while incorporating 6,427 engineering changes! Dodge built 18,413 engines at about half of the estimated program costs. Seldom have the economic benefits of complete tooling, accurate drawings, dedicated leadership, well-trained employees, and a clear set of goals done as well. For perspective, consider that a brand-new Dodge 1942 D22 Custom four-door sedan delivered for $1,048 (Lee, p. 262).
As Admiral Chester Nimitz's forces advanced across the vast Central Pacific, they attacked and occupied the Marianas Islands. The islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian were within effective B-29 range of Japan. Bases were prepared rapidly and the Twenty-First Bomber Command moved in. General Douglas MacArthur's forces had reached Leyte via the jungle of New Guinea, while Admiral Nimitz took island after island in a drive that moved steadily West. The Joint Chiefs of Staff kept control of the B-29s in a separate organization, reporting to General H. H. Arnold in Washington, D. C. Without the sacrifice of thousands of lives and billions spent on other armed forces to wrest bases away from the enemy there would have been no B-29 campaign against the Japanese home islands.
Taken in total, the B-29 program was the most expensive of the war, and it proved decisive against the Japanese home islands. Without torrents of equipment produced by millions of “Home Front” men and women for use by the 11+% of the population in the uniforms of the Armed Forces, the results would have been quite different.
Other company divisions supported Dodge-Chicago in important ways, as well as producing a long list of other equipment and materials that were aircraft-related. A portion of the items furnished included:
Chrysler Corporation's achievements were enormous and vital to victory. The leadership and people of the Chrysler Corporation of that generation proved essential and critical to the energy applied to thwarting fanatical aggressors at a terribly dangerous time in world history. Let us not forget.
Breer, Carl. (1995). [Yanick, A. J., Editor] The Birth of Chrysler Corporation and Its Engineering Legacy. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
Brokaw, Tom. (1998). The Greatest Generation. New York: Random House, Inc..
Dammann, George H. (1974). 70 Years of Chrysler. Sarasota, FL: Crestline Publishing Co., Inc.
Ethell, Jeffrey L. And Price, Alfred. (1989). Target Berlin, Mission 250: 6 March 1944. London: Arms and Armour Press.
Flammang, James M. and the Auto Editors of Consumer Guide. (1998). Chrysler Chronicle. Lincolnwood, Illinois: Publications International, Ltd.
Lee, John. (1990). Standard Catalog of Chrysler - l924-1990. lola, Wisconsin: Krause Publications, Inc.
LeMay, Curtis E. and Venne, Bill. (1988). Superfortress: the story of the B-29 and American Airpower. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Matras, John. (1994, April). "Substance Over Style, The Keller Era." Automobile Quarterly, pp. 43.
Stout, Wesley W. (1947). Great Engines and Great Planes. Detroit, MI: Chrysler Corporation.
Also see: US Air Force Museum, FlightGlobal
They came smashing through the Japanese lines and there it was -- a 1941 Plymouth DeLuxe sedan in the heart of the New Guinea jungle!
On its side was painted the enemy's rising sun insignia. American bullets had drilled the machine so full of holes that the entire top had to be removed. But the motor, according to Staff Sgt. Kenneth B. Schooley, who described the incident, was "in excellent condition, despite having a few, large caliber bullets bounced off it."
After the usual rough jungle travel, he writes, "it's like riding on air." At last report, the sedan was no longer "De Luxe" but it was doing a real job on New Guinea. The medical detachment requisitioned it, took out the back seat, put in a floor, and was using the Plymouth to transport wounded troops from the front.
Plymouth records show that this historic car went from the factory to a dealer on Guam. Probably the Japanese seized it there and took it with them to New Guinea. The full story won't be known until after the war - if then.
But there's no mystery about the reason why Plymouth is a great car on New Guinea or on Main Street. Plymouths were designed and manufactured to do their job under the worst conditions and the best. That quality is now going into Bofors anti-aircraft guns, assemblies for Helldivers, many other war needs. Meanwhile, three million Plymouths are proving their stamina on the roads. They may have to last a long time. They're built to do that when serviced by experienced Plymouth dealers.
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