Chrysler lifts NASA: the next step in the rocket story
Chrysler positioned itself as one of the leading missile manufacturers by being an excellent, high-quality manufacturer. The awarding of a contract for the Redstone Missile System as discussed in the previous chapter was not of political origins, but from the patriotism of Chrysler Corporation as a whole, and the excellent engineering acumen that made its products desirable to have. Moreover, the relationships established by K. T. Keller with President Truman, and major leaders of the United States Military establishment gave strong impetus to purchase "from the best."
To review, K. T. Keller, then retiring as head of Chrysler Corporation, was chosen by President Harry Truman to head the United States Missile Programs based upon a the recommendation of Secretary of Defense, General George C. Marshall. Marshall had been the Chief of Staff of the United States Military since his appointment by Franklin Roosevelt in September 1939. At the time, he leapfrogged several far more senior officers, rising from a single star Brigadier General to full General with 4 stars. Roosevelt's faith was well placed. Marshall later was the first Army officer to receive the 5 star rank in 1944.
Chrysler Corporation began production of the Redstone missile in Warren, Michigan, on September 27, 1954. Earlier models in 1952 and 1953 had been manufactured by Chrysler at the Redstone Ballistic Missile Complex. The quality was outstanding, with the Redstone delivering perfect launch after perfect launch, earning its nickname as "Old Reliable" and the "Army Workhorse." As each contractual goal was reached, the Army reissued the contract, extending Chrysler's work into many years, up through 1961 for the Redstone. It was not, however, the end to Chrysler's work in space by any means.
You Tube production featuring Chrysler Warren Michigan Missile Plant
In February 1956, the Army issued Chrysler a contract to build the Jupiter rocket. The Jupiter was a follow-on rocket developed by Wernher von Braun, who had determined that the Jupiter-C could easily accomplish his long range goals of using rockets for exploration of space. It was a modified Redstone missile with liquid fuel for intermediate range flights.
This missile development was supposed to have been halted. However, von Braun, increasingly frustrated over the politics of the US Government, had disobeyed those orders and continued the development under funds of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). von Braun hid the project under the program supposedly designed to get a satellite into orbit as a “civilian” rocket for the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (IGY). He received tacit approval by General Medaris, the ABMA head, who just happened to agree with von Braun that the US was far behind the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in missile development.
Politically, the slippage in missile development really began in 1952 when the von Braun team was placed in White Sands, New Mexico, out of the loop of political influence, as well as out of the minds of those planners that might have given more impetus to US missile development. Instead, von Braun wiled, almost, away with dreams of huge missiles carrying men to Mars.
The USSR had started to send their captured German scientists back to Germany in 1952, believing that their involvement in Russian missile development held no news for a US intelligence agency. They were wrong, of course. As soon as some of the Russian-captured Germans arrived in West Germany, immediate contact was established with members of von Braun's team in the USA. It didn't take long for the Soviet plans, along with their rocket development capabilities, to become knowledge of the von Braun team or the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] (more accurate and far more correct than the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ever thought of being!) Of course the CIA had the upper hand, and unfortunately, the ear of the President, Dwight Eisenhower. Both the President, and the CIA were desparate for intelligence of things going on behind "The Iron Curtain." von Braun scoffed, stating that, given the go ahead, right then, he could and would place satellites into orbit, as well as manned space craft well ahead of the USSR. Had he been given the "go ahead" in 1952, the USA would have beaten the Russian space efforts, easily, by two full years, and quite possibly, three full years!
President Eisenhower had been pushing for his own initiative of allowing US aircraft overflights of Russian territory, and in return, allowing Russian aircraft to fly over the USA. Pundits were horrified. Members of Congress were dubious about such a treaty. The public at large was also skeptical. Russia at the time was perceived as (to paraphrase Ronald Reagan) the real evil empire in the world. But Eisenhower was not easily deterred. He out of hand rejected the concept of the KH-1 Chronos satellite program because the missile that would have had to be used to launch such units were developed by the military. (No such objections seemed to have been raised about the sort of aircraft that might have been used to fly over Russia had "Project Open Sky" been approved by the two powers. At the time only the in-development B-52 had such a long range suitable for the huge Soviet Republic land areas.)
A direct result of the rejection of the KH-1 Chronos Spy satellite project from the military, was landing it in the hands of the CIA, which had no reservations about how the satellites got into orbit. Development continued on it within the US Air Force, in total secrecy , even from President Eisenhower.
The cost to develop a total missile program, at the time, was considered to be around $5 million. That does not take into consideration the number of missiles — just the single development unit. By Defense Department Standards, that was cheap. von Braun already had a missile, the Jupiter C, built! Had he been allocated funds, imagine what he could have achieved with the $20 million it cost to develop the U-2 spy plane, along with the $35 millions or so spent to other military contractors for development work on the same sort of plane! Not to mention the amount spent on procuring the first 20 U-2s.
Like all programs at the time, missiles just seemed to be in sort of a back seat. The US Air Force, newly formed in 1947, won a great battle in 1949, beating the US Navy in getting funding for the giant B-36 Peacemaker against the Navy's giant super aircraft carrier in the "Revolt of the Admirals." Neither service was focused on missiles , even though both had missile development programs.
Try as he might to capture the attention, or imagination, of planners, politicians, and programs, Wernher von Braun felt betrayed by promises he had received from the Army, along with the politicians in Washington.
Aided by his backwater channels of communication from his German colleagues recently back from Russia, he was increasingly desperate to get America into space. He was aware of the sort of propaganda windfall the country that achieved that goal would receive as being the first. While the US dithered, focused more on military payloads, Russia continued on its course to develop a missile that could deliver a nuclear war head over many thousands of miles as well. The Russian race to explore space, much like the programs in the USA, were mired in political bickering and Kremlin dithering.
Then, scientists announced the International Geophysical Year for 1957 through 1958. Eisenhower deemed it an opportunity to set satellites streaming over Russian land masses without incurring diplomatic protests. Even Russia would not openly object to scientific progress. It would resolve the issue of ownership of airspace above a country. Once the civilian satellites were whizzing overhead, it would set the precedent for the freedom of space sweeping aside Soviet objections even to those missions with a full military application involved.
The missile system developed on the so called "civilian" side was named the Vanguard. This was ordered into production after President Eisenhower formed a top secret committee to determine what the best course of action would be to get a satellite into orbit. Like all such political exercises, it quickly developed into a sort of "not the Germans" mentality. Representatives from all the armed services, and several members from the civilian rocket companies, voted the Vanguard program that the Navy had initiated, and shelved, as the best program, giving it a "civilian" generated label. The costs were to be held at $12 million.
von Braun was aghast. He fought the decision, as did General Medaris. However, Eisenhower seemed to harbor deep reservations about Wernher von Braun and his team of German scientists. Without openly expressing his discontent with their presence, the President politely set aside anything that came from that group.
As von Braun and Medaris had warned, costs to get Vanguard into space quickly rose. Off the shelf parts, supposedly the savior of the means that Vanguard had come into being, were found to require extensive retrofit to meet the demand to get into orbit. At $100 million, von Braun and Medaris rose to the occasion, with objections that started to gain traction in Congress and in the public eye. Several major media outlets began to question the President's decision to champion an obvious failed booster system in early 1956. General Medaris of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency presented the already complete, and ready to launch Chrysler Built Jupiter C as an alternative to the huge cost over runs in the Vanguard rocket program.
About the same time, the huge Soviet launch complex at Baikonur was under construction. The Russians were well into building their huge rocket, with engine testing begun in January 1956.
President Eisenhower reluctantly allowed that the Jupiter C could be test fired. However, he was adamant that no satellite was to be put into orbit, clinging to his increasingly hopeless Open Sky treaty. Instead an inert mass was loaded into the upper orbiter stage which would be programmed for a sub-orbital shot. von Braun was frustrated, but he accepted the program. President Eisenhower was not pleased, but he was said to have been impressed with how von Braun had covered his tracks in building the Jupiter.
On September 20, 1956, the first USA satellite COULD HAVE been a reality because the Jupiter C, like the reliable Redstone, performed flawlessly. The dead weight sailing up and into space would have gone into earth orbit.
The 31.5 pound dud satellite went 3,300 miles down range from Cape Canaveral at a height of 680 miles.
Two more successful launches of the rather inexpensive Jupiter C occurred on May 15, 1957. That flight lifted a 300 pound inert dud 350 miles into space, going 710 miles down range. The August 8, 1957 shot sent 100 pounds 285 miles high and 1,500 miles down range from Cape Canaveral Florida. Three shots that would have pushed the USA into greatness fell, blighted by prejudice and political bickering. This same Jupiter C was ready for launch in 1955, and could have easily been launched then, two years ahead of the Soviets.
Out of that development Chrysler Corporation was given a contract to build the Jupiter in November 1956.
On October 4, 1957, the world was stood on its ear. Russia launched the first manmade "moon" into orbit over the earth. Sputnik (tiny moon) criss-crossed the world every 96 minutes. The media frenzy overcame expectations of the Soviets. It appeared that Russia was the totally dominant technological leader of the world. They weren't. However, there was no way to measure their progress, so no way to tell the world the real truth. Soviet Premier Khrushchev never expected that.
Eisenhower was furious, taken totally by surprise. He felt, and rightly so, that the CIA had deliberately misled him on Soviet space progress. Senator Lyndon Johnson initiated, with White House approval, a far reaching investigation of how the USA lost the space race. US military leaders were scrambling for any sort of concept to not only overcome, but take the lead in space. It would come, but at a great price, and far into the future, as Russia kept their pace of space first after first.
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I was 11 years old at the time. My father was angry, and like all Americans shocked as well as concerned. It seemed that American was defenseless, vulnerable to Soviet domination, with a space based attack able to come at any time. A Sputnik flight path was announced over our local TV station, along with the times that the little moon would be visible over our American heads. It was an awesome moment to look up into the crystal clear Autumn night, and see the brightly shining satellite tracking straight over our country. We watched the satellite many times over many days. America seemed to have had no answer. Further Soviet domination was seen when in the very next month, the Soviets put a dog into orbit. The first American answer was a single stage launch test by Vanguard on 23 October 1957. It was very suborbital, with only one stage tested, and was barely noticed in the hue and cry of Soviet excellence in space.
On December 6, 1957 the vaulted Vanguard satellite launching rocket only achieved a complete failure on its own pad. The whole world was watching as it simply exploded in a huge fireball. Some very large newspapers ran full color photos of the explosion, labeling them "Kaputnik." Word was sent quickly to have von Braun get a satellite into orbit using the Jupiter C.
As von Braun had repeatedly stated, he could achieve orbit within 60 days of getting the go ahead. He was good to his word, putting America's first satellite into orbit on February 1, 1958. This is still in orbit today, long after all theearlier Sputniks have crashed back into the Earth.
Even with the huge success, and verification that von Braun had been correct all along, American remained convinced that the USA had suddenly become a second rate power! Sputnik was still being hailed as the best greatest achievement of all time. The USA had no real intelligence to get a peek at what the Soviets were doing.
Even at that, Eisenhower still backed the Vanguard project. The Soviet triumph did resolve the issue of "free" space, whereby satellites whizzed overhead of any country on Earth. Project Corona, the Keyhole spy satellite program, directed by the CIA went ahead with full force. Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson appointed himself as the head of a committee to determine why we "lost" the space race. Later as Vice-President, he would be put in civilian charge of NASA. He would use his influence unmercifully to pound on von Braun and NASA to fulfill President Kennedy's declaration of getting a man on the moon and safely back home again.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was signed into law by President Eisenhower on July 29, 1958. Part of the discussion about forming NASA was President Eisenhower’s insistence upon the manned section being staffed with recognized test pilots and only one agency to be in overall charge. On that same date, President Eisenhower also announced that there would be a totally new building and location for NASA which would be the George C. Marshall Space Center in Huntsville Alabama.
Two days after NASA became law, on August 1 1958, the US Army launched its 50th Chrysler-built Redstone off Johnson Island in the Pacific Ocean. It was the center piece of Operation Hardtack, which was one of 77 open air nuclear tests conducted by the military in 1958. Operation Teak shot the 50th Redstone, which lifted a 3.8 megaton thermonuclear device to 252,000 feet, 47 miles, which is considered to be "space" as being outside the upper limits of Earth atmosphere. Due to a programming error, the missile did not track down range. Instead the bomb exploded directly over the island. It caused a huge disruption in radio and unleashed a particularly large amount of dirty radiation into the upper ionic atmosphere due to the type of device. The missile built by Chrysler Corporation performed flawlessly despite the human programming error.
Chrysler and Wernher von Braun, already well connected, became more so when NASA awarded Chrysler Corporation a contract to manufacture seven Jupiter Redstone missiles in late 1958. These missiles were for the Explorer satellite program that had seen the Vanguard project quietly shelved.
Shortly thereafter, Chrysler was awarded a contract for the Army Ballistic Missile Agency for $52 million to build Jupiter Redstone boosters. These were for weaponry. Nuclear warheads were making rapid increases in destructive power, as well as becoming smaller and lighter for easier launch on a missile.
In 1958, the best missiles, such as the Redstone and Jupiter C, had in the ranges of 80,000 pounds to 160,000 pounds of thrust. Wernher von Braun knew that something to the tune of 6 million pounds of thrust would be needed to lift and accelerate the satellite or capsule to 25,000 miles an hour and escape Earth’s gravity.
After seeing the embrace of his Jupiter C rocket, he turned to the engineers at Chrysler Corporation to continue his unfulfilled dream of manned space exploration. He laid out his concepts. Chrysler immediately began research and exploration for a means to build such a 6 million pound thrust vehicle. They already had some things done from interests done in 1956.
Following interests lead by von Braun, Chrysler engineering began looking at engines that were currently developed. The Air Force had the F-1 Rocketdyne engine that had been built in a study done in 1955. The size was good, and the power was 1.5 million pounds of thrust. However, further development was halted because such a huge engine had no perceived use at that time. Chrysler began designs that coupled the engines together. A series of mechanical drawings rendered 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 engine configurations working together. Imagine the 8 engine booster would have been a monster with 12 million pounds of thrust! Pundits dubbed the concepts of rockets as "Cluster’s Last Stand," because they doubted such designs would work.
Suddenly, at the end of 1959, the US Army decided it no longer wanted to be in the big thruster business. It proposed that its missile development programs and Dr. Wernher von Braun be sent over to NASA. von Braun balked. He didn't understand the Army's reasoning. However, it was clear that NASA was now the head of any space effort, and funds for big booster development could be utilized by the Army into other areas. von Braun made it clear that he was displeased with the decision of the Army, and would have many reservations about any appointment to NASA.
Army planners saw the handwriting on the wall when a group of newly appointed high ranking NASA officials came calling upon General Medaris. On December 2, 1958, the NASA officials wanted the opinion of the ABMA on the feasibility of utilizing the Chrysler built Redstone as the booster for the manned space program. For Redstone itself, thank the saints that Chrysler Corporation quality was far above the quality that was being built into their cars of the period. Redstone at that point in time had experienced between 70 and 75 launches (numbers vary because of military secrecy) without a single failure. It was no wonder NASA came calling to use the Redstone. NASA also wanted the ABMA to discuss costs of building a series of rockets.
On January 8, 1959, NASA requested that ABMA, through Chrysler build 8 Redstone rockets for the Mercury Project. Prices of the contract were still under negotiation. On January 16, 1959, NASA also wanted ABMA and Chrysler to serve as the launch directors of the eight rockets! NASA also requested building and prices of two Jupiter C rockets to be included in the overall contract.
The program built intensity quickly. Meetings were held continuously. Some were planned, others called spontaneously, at times a dozen a month. The price for the contract had not been yet finalized due to the ever expanding mission goals and safety related items involved in manned flights.
Chrysler continued with missile production, and kept the big booster development program going, as well as becoming heavily involved in the NASA Mercury Project. von Braun had re-named the big booster program as "Saturn", the planet after Jupiter.
On June 24, 1959, Chrysler and NASA finally settled the contract pricing for the missile set for Project Mercury. Initially, Chrysler had told NASA that they felt the costs for the 8 Redstone rockets would be projected at $15 million. In the interim months, two additional Jupiter C rockets had been ordered as well as Chrysler and ABMA chosen to be the launch company. Additional safety and mission enhancements increased the costs. Chrysler, never, at that time, one to seek big profits in defense work, offered up a fly away cost of the entire Project Mercury set at $20 million. Expecting far more, NASA officials unhesitantly accepted the amount.
While jubilation followed at Chrysler and ABMA, the Army officials found themselves increasingly pushed outside the decision making loops. von Braun failed to notice the widening chasm between himself and the US Army. The final straw probably occurred on December 22, 1959 when the first NASA Redstone was set up at the ABMA site for testing! No one asked the Army.
The Marshall Space Center in Huntsville opened for business on July 1, 1960. However, the Army team had arrived, without Dr. von Braun. It took a face to face meeting with a military physicist, in the Pentagon, with authorization to settle the issues. von Braun made it very clear that he would never go to NASA unless the big booster rocket programs were a priority. The issues were overcome. Dr. Wernher von Braun was named the Marshall Center's first Director, taking his full time office in July 1960.
Chrysler had not been idle during any of that time. Now, with von Braun in the driver's seat of NASA, their place in the space race would be assured.
The work done by Chrysler began to pay off. The first test of their concepts from von Braun's ideas culminated in the Saturn I rocket. It used the cluster design, but not the F-1 engine. Instead it boosted loads based on 8 H-1 engines that had 130,000 pounds of thrust each.
Chrysler built 10 Saturn I vehicles. All were used by NASA with no failures.
Quickly proving that the clusters were not only viable, but economical to produce, NASA and Chrysler moved quickly to bigger and better lift systems. At this point all other missile contracts for Redstone (now obsolete) Jupiter, Jupiter C had been completed. No more such contracts were extended since the missile systems had quickly all been obsolete with new technology.
Chrysler designed and built the next Saturn Rocket, the Saturn IB. It too had a cluster of 8 H-1 rocket motors, but they had been up rated to 200K pounds of thrust each, giving the IB 1.6 million pounds of thrust. Chrysler built, and NASA, flew nine of the Saturn IB without any failures. They were not the sole single source, though, for this rocket.
Things were very quickly ramping up in the space race. The President and Congress found area after area to agree upon and funding flowed like ocean water through an open portal. Chrysler quickly realized in early 1960, that even before the eventual development of the Saturn I, that it could not sustain the level of being a single source contract to fulfill the upcoming demands of the heavy lift vehicle. Chrysler would remain a prime contractor, but with the huge developments mounting quickly within NASA, they would not be the sole builders of the heavy rockets going to the moon.
Next: From Chrysler to The Moon
