I've studied the history of Chrysler extensively, and that's a question that's never been talked about much, if ever.
After the K-Cars
From reading allpar over the years I learned (if I understood correctly) that the Chrysler of the nineties was heavily influenced by AMC. Not just by vehicles like the LH cars and the Grand Cherokee but also engineering and production methodologies. I always wondered what Chrysler’s pipeline looked like for future models before they absorbed AMC. What would Chrysler have looked like in the nineties without AMC?
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Supposedly Iacocca was still pulling for more K car variants. The new stuff was pretty much forced on him.
If it was indeed forced, it had to be. The K cars were no match for the new competition.Supposedly Iacocca was still pulling for more K car variants. The new stuff was pretty much forced on him.
Off-topic here, but I always was curious on how Chrysler Corp. would’ve looked like without the merger with Daimler. Would Plymouth still be around? Quality improvements?
The Kenosha M-body agreement between Chrysler, AMC, and UAW 72 was signed in 1985. Production began in early 1987. The merger happened later that year. The L body joined the M-body for 1988, and both made it to mid-'89.
The original agreement was for KAP to build the M-body for 5 years from Job 1, or through 1992. At that time, Kenosha was to get the new ZJ Grand Cherokee. Once Chrysler started getting wind of the new AMC products, they knew it was time to pounce, and they did.
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That's when and where it all started. Kenosha Historical has interviews of KAP workers and Local 72 leaders on YouTube. They tell the whole story.
The original agreement was for KAP to build the M-body for 5 years from Job 1, or through 1992. At that time, Kenosha was to get the new ZJ Grand Cherokee. Once Chrysler started getting wind of the new AMC products, they knew it was time to pounce, and they did.
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That's when and where it all started. Kenosha Historical has interviews of KAP workers and Local 72 leaders on YouTube. They tell the whole story.
As an outsider who knows very little about what happened there in the eighties it does seem impressive that Chrysler did not let its "ego" stand in its way and adopted things from AMC where it looked like they were doing things better. And I assume Chrysler was still somewhat resource strapped. It seems like it was a "match made in heaven" though combining Tom Gale's designs of the early nineties with AMC's technology and engineering. Makes me wonder if while they were starting to be financially successful again engineering wise they were a bit stuck in a rut just like Apple was in the nineties and got its reboot when it purchased NeXT.
Chrysler, besides adopting concepts and design principles from AMC, also adopted production and design strategies from the Japanese. Of course it all came to a crashing end in 1998. Heil Daimler!
Plymouth was already being killed by Chrysler before Daimler as I recall. I knew it was the end for Plymouth when the cloud cars debuted, and the Plymouth version (Breeze) was not released for another year - only the Dodge and Chrysler cloud cars debuted initially.Off-topic here, but I always was curious on how Chrysler Corp. would’ve looked like without the merger with Daimler. Would Plymouth still be around? Quality improvements?
You can trace the end of Plymouth back to 1979.
When the new R body full size cars rolled out, Dodge got one, Chrysler got two, and Plymouth got none. They made up for it the next year, but repeated the same thing with the next two large car releases (C/Y aka AC/AY and LH). These would have been good opportunities to strengthen Plymouth by eliminating the 1979 Newport and making it Plymouth from the beginning, eliminating the base/Salon New Yorker in 1988 and making that a Plymouth, and making the Chrysler Concorde a Plymouth.
So the problem wasn’t Daimler Chrysler. The problem was Chrysler.
When the new R body full size cars rolled out, Dodge got one, Chrysler got two, and Plymouth got none. They made up for it the next year, but repeated the same thing with the next two large car releases (C/Y aka AC/AY and LH). These would have been good opportunities to strengthen Plymouth by eliminating the 1979 Newport and making it Plymouth from the beginning, eliminating the base/Salon New Yorker in 1988 and making that a Plymouth, and making the Chrysler Concorde a Plymouth.
So the problem wasn’t Daimler Chrysler. The problem was Chrysler.
That was my recollection hearing as well. Think the Spirit's evolution over something like the Intrepid.Supposedly Iacocca was still pulling for more K car variants. The new stuff was pretty much forced on him.
I thought there was a plan to reinvigorate Plymouth and sunset Eagle. The retro style would be the design language going forward for Plymouth with the Prowler and the Cruiser (later becoming the PT Cruiser) being the first foray into that new design language.Plymouth was already being killed by Chrysler before Daimler as I recall. I knew it was the end for Plymouth when the cloud cars debuted, and the Plymouth version (Breeze) was not released for another year - only the Dodge and Chrysler cloud cars debuted initially.
Yes, there was that plan. This was put in place for the most part after Lee was on his way to retirement.That was my recollection hearing as well. Think the Spirit's evolution over something like the Intrepid.
I thought there was a plan to reinvigorate Plymouth and sunset Eagle. The retro style would be the design language going forward for Plymouth with the Prowler and the Cruiser (later becoming the PT Cruiser) being the first foray into that new design language.
One has to remember the mindset going on on the early 80s. Lee wanted everything based on the K car. Including trucks. When they figured out trucks weren't at that time very good on a FWD platform, then the Dakota was green lighted. The big trucks were going to be eliminated, but the smartest man at Chrysler at that time, decided it was a good idea to give Cummins a truck to play with so they could install a B series engine in it. Whoever that was, was smarter then most of the rest of their marketing people back then. After that they decided to stay in the full-size truck business and the T-300 was born. That truck, the minivan, and buying Jeep saved the company. There were other smaller hits, but those three, have made all the money since.
Actually, the elimination of Plymouth began before that. There was no US Plymouth M-body until 1982. There was no equivalent to the '78-'79 Dodge Magnum, no 1979 Fury, no '80-'83 Plymouth J-body, no '88-'93 AC body, no R25 (Premiere/Monaco), and no LH.You can trace the end of Plymouth back to 1979.
When the new R body full size cars rolled out, Dodge got one, Chrysler got two, and Plymouth got none. They made up for it the next year, but repeated the same thing with the next two large car releases (C/Y aka AC/AY and LH). These would have been good opportunities to strengthen Plymouth by eliminating the 1979 Newport and making it Plymouth from the beginning, eliminating the base/Salon New Yorker in 1988 and making that a Plymouth, and making the Chrysler Concorde a Plymouth.
So the problem wasn’t Daimler Chrysler. The problem was Chrysler.
Chrysler allowed Plymouth a full product line (in the US) through 1976. After that, and I believe the story is here at Allpar somewhere, Gene Ciefero decided that Plymouth had to go. That's ignoring the fact that Plymouth was the #3 selling brand in the US, up until that point. That bit them in the caboose, every single time - each missing model cost them unknown sales from loyal Plymouth customers. Dodges and Chryslers were always more expensive. In the late 70's and early 80's, as stagflation and sky-high interest rates hit, every penny counted. The only anomaly was the inversion of sales between the Diplomat and Fury from '82 through '89, but what happened there is the Dodge was able to maintain a higher level of retail sales, while the Plymouth was the primary fleet vehicle. That was exacerbated in 1984, when the proposed M-body Chrysler Newport was instead released as the Diplomat SE. The Fury carried on as an almost solely corporate and government fleet vehicle, and that was the only other smart thing Chrysler did with Plymouth at that time, besides the minivans.
Interesting as the Minivans were introduced exclusively Plymouth and Dodge Vehicles, and the Chrysler didn't show up until the after the mid-cycle refresh and even then it only showed up as the long wheelbase version, while Dodge and Plymouth got both short and long version after the mid-cycle refresh in 87.Actually, the elimination of Plymouth began before that. There was no US Plymouth M-body until 1982. There was no equivalent to the '78-'79 Dodge Magnum, no 1979 Fury, no '80-'83 Plymouth J-body, no '88-'93 AC body, no R25 (Premiere/Monaco), and no LH.
Chrysler allowed Plymouth a full product line (in the US) through 1976. After that, and I believe the story is here at Allpar somewhere, Gene Ciefero decided that Plymouth had to go. That's ignoring the fact that Plymouth was the #3 selling brand in the US, up until that point. That bit them in the caboose, every single time - each missing model cost them unknown sales from loyal Plymouth customers. Dodges and Chryslers were always more expensive. In the late 70's and early 80's, as stagflation and sky-high interest rates hit, every penny counted. The only anomaly was the inversion of sales between the Diplomat and Fury from '82 through '89, but what happened there is the Dodge was able to maintain a higher level of retail sales, while the Plymouth was the primary fleet vehicle. That was exacerbated in 1984, when the proposed M-body Chrysler Newport was instead released as the Diplomat SE. The Fury carried on as an almost solely corporate and government fleet vehicle, and that was the only other smart thing Chrysler did with Plymouth at that time, besides the minivans.
There was no need for a Plymouth M body in the beginning as M was an upscale F. Let the lower Dodge and Plymouth lines have the F and the upper line Chrysler (and Dodge because it spanned both) have the M. Same with the premium B body (Cordoba, Magnum, Charger) for the higher brands and the basic Monaco and Fury (their last names after lots of name swaps ) for the lower trim lines. Same for the J body, a premium vehicle that has no place in a Plymouth line.Actually, the elimination of Plymouth began before that. There was no US Plymouth M-body until 1982. There was no equivalent to the '78-'79 Dodge Magnum, no 1979 Fury, no '80-'83 Plymouth J-body, no '88-'93 AC body, no R25 (Premiere/Monaco), and no LH.
As bad as Daimler ended being for Chrysler, the RWD LX cars --300, Magnum and Charger, and its derivative Challenger, may never have come to fruition. These cars have been cash cows for Auburn Hills for many years.
At the same time, Grand Cherokee may not have gotten as soft as it is today. I test drove WK2 many times; was never able to pull the trigger: it felt more like driving a sedan than a Jeep.
At the same time, Grand Cherokee may not have gotten as soft as it is today. I test drove WK2 many times; was never able to pull the trigger: it felt more like driving a sedan than a Jeep.
AMC = AlMost a car. That was a running joke back in the day by the folks who worked there when I did.
Chrysler bought AMC for Jeep and got stuck with the passenger cars.
The biggest reason I left AMC for Chrysler was the poor quality, shoddy engineering and bad designs at AMC.
Seeing an early Premier was the final straw!
It took Chrysler Engineering to fix the Premier and use parts of it for the LH Platform.
When I arrived at the Highland Park complex, I thought that I had died and went to heaven, that's how much more advanced Chrysler was over AMC.
Chrysler bought AMC for Jeep and got stuck with the passenger cars.
The biggest reason I left AMC for Chrysler was the poor quality, shoddy engineering and bad designs at AMC.
Seeing an early Premier was the final straw!
It took Chrysler Engineering to fix the Premier and use parts of it for the LH Platform.
When I arrived at the Highland Park complex, I thought that I had died and went to heaven, that's how much more advanced Chrysler was over AMC.
It is simply amazing that the “bones” from that sorry Premier (beautiful car, mechanically no way ready for prime time) worked so well for the LH. That’s the kind of Chrysler engineering I was proud of (as a purchaser, not as an employee).It took Chrysler Engineering to fix the Premier and use parts of it for the LH Platform.
Including trucks? I can't even imagine that being something that would be a strong seller. I don't mind the K cars and it's variants but Lee went a little nuts with some ideas for it.One has to remember the mindset going on on the early 80s. Lee wanted everything based on the K car. Including trucks. When they figured out trucks weren't at that time very good on a FWD platform, then the Dakota was green lighted. The big trucks were going to be eliminated, but the smartest man at Chrysler at that time, decided it was a good idea to give Cummins a truck to play with so they could install a B series engine in it. Whoever that was, was smarter then most of the rest of their marketing people back then. After that they decided to stay in the full-size truck business and the T-300 was born. That truck, the minivan, and buying Jeep saved the company. There were other smaller hits, but those three, have made all the money since.
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